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Abstract 
This paper analyses the evolution of the bidding strategies of nuclear power plants on the Spanish 
day-ahead auction market, over the 11-year period from 2002 until December 2012. During that time 
the proportion of renewable energy especially wind and solar power increased dramatically. At the 
outset the nuclear plants offered almost all their production at zero cost; by the end, several were 
offering about 5% of their production at about 91 euro per MWh compared to the market ceiling 
price of 180.3 euro per MWh. This change in bidding strategy effectively increased the average 
wholesale price of electricity, leading to an overall increase in the revenues to power sellers of about 
$200 million euros per year in 2010 -2012, compared to what it would have been had they offered all 
their production at zero -cost. These results have important policy implications for regulatory 
authorities. 
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1. Introduction 
According to the Economist (2013), power providers in Europe have lost over 500 billion euros in 
share value since 2008. Their income from traditional power stations has dropped, mainly because of 
the massive introduction of renewable energy. For example, the underlying income of Germany’s 
biggest utility, E.ON, dropped by 46% from 2012 to 20131. The second largest utility in Germany, 
RWE, saw its pre-tax income from continuing operations drop from +4978 M euros in 2010 to -1487 
M euros in 20132, while in Spain, Iberdrola’s pre-tax profit dropped by 60% between 2012 and 20133.  
During 2013, wind and solar power provided about 22% of the electricity generated in Germany and 
more than 30% in Spain. Both countries had offered advantageous feed-in tariffs to encourage the 
development of wind and solar farms. As renewable energies have grid priority, they displace 
traditional baseload producers such as coal-fired and nuclear power stations from the bottom of the 
merit order. Gas-fired plants operate for far fewer hours per year and are making a loss. Ideally, they 
should shut down but they are required as back-up when the wind drops. While wholesale electricity 
prices have dropped on average, retail prices have increased due to the subsidies on renewables 
(Ciarret, Espinosa & Pizarro-Irizar, 2014). 
The massive introduction of subsidized renewable energy is not the only factor causing difficulties for 
utilities. Other factors have aggravated the situation. The shale gas boom in North America means 
that US power plants are turning to gas and away from coal which is being exported to Europe. 
Because the electricity consumption had increased from 2000 to 2008 and had been expected to 
continue to increase, many new power plants were constructed (Cossent, Gomez & Olmos, 2011) but 
from 2008 onwards the electricity demand has dropped because of the global economic crisis.  
In this paper, we postulate that given the sharp drop in the income of traditional power generators, 
they have steadily changed their bidding strategies to enhance their profitability. To test this 
hypothesis, we carried out an empirical study of the behavior of nuclear power plants in Spain. The 
main reason for focusing on Spain is that the Iberian power exchange OMIE has a very open policy on 
releasing information. Bids are available on its website after a delay of three months. These give the 
name of the production unit, together with the quantity and price offered (and likewise for buyers). 
This makes it possible to track the evolution in bidding strategies.  
Another reason for choosing Spain is that while it is coupled with Portugal, it has connections with 
only two other countries, Morocco and France. As these account for less than 5% of the power 
consumption, the Iberian Peninsula is almost isolated. We chose to focus on nuclear power plants 
rather than say coal or gas-fired plants, because there are only 9 of them and together they account 
for about 20% of the electricity consumed in Spain. The period under study starts in 2002 when 
renewable energy was just starting to come on line, and goes till the end of 2012. In 2013, the 
Spanish government stopped paying feed-in tariffs. 
                                                          
1
 E.ON Group Financial Highlights 2013 available from https://www.eon.com/en/investors/key-figures.html 
2
 RWE Key Data Tool 2013 available from http://rwe-datatool.com/?lang=eng 
3
 Iberdrola Consolidated Financial Statements, Management Report and auditor’s Report for Fiscal Year 2013 
Available from https://www.iberdrola.es/webibd/gc/prod/en/doc/IA_CuentasAnualesConsolidadas2013.pdf 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the regulatory framework for 
renewable energy in Spain, we describe the structure of the Spanish and Portuguese electricity 
sector (Section 2). In Section 3, we present our empirical study of how the bidding strategies of 
nuclear plants have evolved from 2002 to 2012. First we show that the period 2002 to 2012 can be 
split into three parts: an early period from 2002 to mid-2004 when renewable energy was just getting 
under way; a middle period from mid-2004 to the mid-2009 when the number of renewable energy 
producers increased rapidly and the final period from late 2009 till 2012 when the situation 
stabilized. At the outset the nuclear plants offered almost all their production at zero cost; by the 
end, several plants were offering part of their production at about 91 euro per MWh compared to 
the ceiling price of 180.3 euro per MWh. The question is how much impact does this have on prices? 
To estimate the effect this had, we built a counter-factual time series of prices for the period 2010 – 
2012 assuming that the nuclear power plants proposed the same amount but at a zero price. No 
other changes in bidding strategy were envisaged. The average difference between the true prices 
and those in the counterfactual series is about 1 euro per MWh. When multiplied by the total 
quantity transacted on the day-ahead market gives an additional cost of about 200 million euros per 
year in Spain over the three year period. In the conclusions (Section 4) we discuss the implications of 
these findings. 
2. Regulatory Framework for the Day-ahead Market and for Renewable Energy 
2.1 Regulatory Framework for Renewable Energy 
The European Union’s 20-20-20 climate and energy policy set three key objectives for 2020: 
· A 20% reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels; 
· Raising the power produced from renewable energies to 20% of EU energy consumption  
· A 20% improvement in the EU’s energy efficiency. 
The Spanish government has been active in implementing this policy4. From 2004 to 2010, it provided 
generous incentives in the form of feed-in tariffs and premiums to support renewable energy 
producers (Saenz de Miera et al, 2008; Rivier Abbad, 2010; del Rio Gonzalez, 2008; Cossent et al, 
2011; Ciarrreta et al, 2014). The Special Regime as it was called, covered wind power, solar power 
(both photovoltaic and thermal), small hydropower (less than 50 MW) biomass and cogeneration. 
The feed-in tariffs were progressively reduced from 2010 until 2013 when they were stopped.  There 
were two reasons for this: firstly, the introduction of renewable energy had been a success and 
secondly due to the global financial crisis the Spanish government had to reduce its spending 
(Espinosa, 2013a; Ciarrreta et al, 2014). 
As these incentives were very successful, the quantity of renewable energy increased rapidly causing 
problems for traditional power plants especially peak producers. In 2007, the Spanish government 
introduced capacity payments (“Garantia de Potencia”) designed to ensure the security of supply 
(Carbajo Josa, 2007; CNE 2012).  Power plants received annual payments of about 20,000 euros per 
MW per year for the first 10 years of production to help cover investment costs. In addition 
combined cycles, coal-fired plants, fuel-oil plants that were available at times of peak demand 
                                                          
4
 The EU decisions and the Spanish Royal Decrees are available on the website of the Iberian power exchange 
OMIE: http://www.omel.es/en/home/market-regulations 
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received an annual payment of around 4500 euro per MW; dam and step hydro power plants 
received about 1200 euro per MW per year. 
2.2 Market structure in Spain 
The electricity sector in Spain was liberalized in 1998 after the promulgation of the Royal Decree 
2019/1997.  This gave rise to the day-ahead market where the price is fixed for each 1-hour period in 
24 uniform price auctions, and to an intra-day market which allows buyers and sellers to update the 
amounts that they want to buy/sell. In Spain, this consists of 6 uniform price auctions at different 
times prior to delivery in contrast to the continuous-time intraday market in Central Western Europe 
(France, Germany, Belgium & the Netherlands).  
In July 2007, the Spanish and Portuguese market operators were merged, forming a common market 
called OMIE for the whole of the Iberian Peninsula. One difference between OMIE and most other 
European day-ahead markets is that bids are limited to being between 0 and 180.3 per MWh, 
compared to between -500 euro and +3000 euros for the CWE market. 
During the period under study, bids to buy or sell electricity on the day-ahead market had to be sent 
by 10am on the day prior to delivery (by 12 noon after 15 October 2013). These consist of up to 25 
pairs (called blocks) of a volume and a price, with the prices arranged in ascending order for sellers 
and conversely for buyers. One specific feature of the Iberian market is that in addition to simple 
bids, sellers may incorporate four types of complex bids5 in their offer, namely 
2. Indivisibility (A minimum operating value can be fixed to the first block) 
3. Load gradients (A maximum difference between the power to be delivered from one hour to 
the next) 
4. Minimum income (The unit is only called if its income that day exceeds a certain value6) 
5. Scheduled stop (This allows units that have been withdrawn because they did not reach the 
minimum income required to carry out a scheduled stop.  
These constraints have an enormous effect on market prices. The fine brown line in Fig 1 shows 
the aggregate curve of all the offers to sell electricity for the tenth hour (H10) on 17 January 2011 
when the market-clearing price was 53 euro per MWh for a total of 32,017 MW. The blue line 
shows all the offers to buy power, with those that were accepted shown in bold. The bold red 
line shows the offers to sell that were accepted after the complex constraints had been taken 
into account. Without these constraints, the price would have been much lower: 15.6 euros per 
MWh. We will refer to the price without constraints as the theoretical price. 
One of the reasons for choosing to study the Spanish market is that OMIE, the Iberian power 
Exchange, is much more open than most power exchanges. It releases the full data on the bids 
three months afterwards on its website. Because the names of the production units are included, 
it is possible to study the evolution of their bidding strategies over time. 
                                                          
5
 See the OMIE website for details: http://www.omel.es/en/home/markets-and-products/electricity-
market/our-electricity-markets/daily-market 
 
6
 Suarez Pozo (2014) studied the impact of this condition on day-ahead prices. 
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Figure 1. Aggregates curves on Spanish day-ahead market for the tenth hour (H10) on 17 January 
2011. The market clearing gave a price of 53 euro per MWh, for a volume of 32,017 MW. The fine 
brown line is of all the offers to sell electricity whereas the blue line shows all the offers to buy power, 
with those that were accepted shown in bold. The bold red line shows the offers to sell that were 
accepted after the complex constraints had been taken into account. Without these constraints, the 
price would have been much lower: 15.6 euros per MWh. We will refer to the price without 
constraints as the theoretical price. Source of Data: OMIE. Our presentation. 
Each production unit is identified by a code containing up to 7 characters. For example, BES1 denotes 
the thermal power plant C.T. Besos 1 owned by Endesa; BES4 is the combined cycle C.C. Besos 4 
owned by Gas Natural; WMRE122 owned by Wind To Market operates under the Special Regime 
while WMVD161 also owned by Wind To Market sells excess production (i.e. not under the Special 
Regime)7. All told, there are more than 3000 such codes when the commercial buyers & sellers, 
importers and exporters, end consumers, distributors and generators are included. While it is easy to 
work out what type of fuel the traditional producers are using, this is much more difficult for the 
renewable energy producers. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Studies on bidding strategies in Spain 
This is not the first study on bidding behavior in the Spanish wholesale electricity market. Fabra & 
Toro (2005) and Ciarreta and Espinosa (2005) studied the day-ahead market up to 2003, that is, 
before the introduction of renewable energies. At that time there were two large producers, Endesa 
and Iberdrola, each with about 35% market share, and two smaller producers, Union Fenosa and 
Hidrocantabrico. Fabra & Toro (2005) focused on the dynamics between Endesa and Iberdrola during 
the first 12 months after the liberalization of the market (i.e. Jan – Dec 1998). They showed that 
                                                          
7
 See the file “Lista Unidades” on the OMIE website for the full list. 
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these two producers alternated between price wars and episodes of collusion. Going further, 
Ciarreta and Espinosa (2005) showed that smaller firms such as Union Fenosa and Hidrocantabrico 
bid production at its marginal cost whereas larger firms such as Endesa and Iberdrola optimize their 
profitability by strategic bidding. 
Both studies concluded that the traditional power companies were bidding strategically in the period 
1998 – 2003. From 2004 onward, more and more renewable energy was produced in Spain. This was 
introduced onto the day-ahead market at zero-cost (because of the feed-in tariffs), thereby making 
traditional power stations less profitable. Our hypothesis is that they will have continued using 
bidding strategies to enhance their revenue. The question we attempt to answer in this paper is 
precisely what strategies are they using. 
3.2 Strategic bidding and market power 
The topics of market power and strategic bidding have received considerable attention over the past 
20 years since energy markets were liberalized, especially after the Californian electricity crisis in 
2000. According Joskow (2001), government officials believed that power plants had been withdrawn 
from service at least partially for strategic reasons. Fridolfsson and Tangeras (2009) described inter-
temporal strategies where hydro-generators in Nordic countries overproduced in summer so that 
thermal plants with higher costs would have to come on line to meet the demand in winter.  
In their analysis of the Californian crisis using Cournot games, Borenstein and Bushnell (1998) 
showed that there was potential for individual firms to exercise market power in the high demand 
hours over several months of the year. They also noted the possibility that “firms engaging in 
repeated interactions with one another may compete less aggressively over time”. This idea was 
pursued by Tellidou and Bakirtzis (2007). By considering electricity markets as a repeated game in 
which SA-Q learning took place and by using agent-based simulations they showed that tacit 
collusion could emerge because of reinforcement learning.  
In this paper we subscribe to the idea that players who compete regularly in the same auctions, 
develop strategies for increasing their profits. Several factors prevent them from optimizing their 
strategies: firstly, the demand is not perfectly known; secondly, the introduction of new entrants 
(renewable energy producers) changes the number of players, and thirdly, new regulations are 
brought in by the government, thereby changing the nature of the game. 
3.3 Analysing the bids in the Spanish day-ahead market 
Traditional power plants usually have a maximum capacity of over 300 MW. Typically CCGTs have a 
capacity of 350 – 400 MW; for nuclear plants it is around 1000 MW and the biggest hydro plants have 
a capacity over 3000 MW (e.g. those on the Douro & Tagus Rivers). Conversely, most renewable 
energy plants are small - less than 50 MW. Having said that, there are exceptions: the wind farms 
WMVD088 and WMVD092 have capacities of more than 1000 MW and 300 MW, respectively. 
We computed the maximum amount offered by each producer during each quarter from 2002 to 
2012, and then determined the number of producers in three ranges: 0 – 150 MW, 150 – 300 MW 
and above 300 MW.  
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Figure 2: Quarterly evolution of the number of small, medium and large producers of electricity from 
2002 to 2012. Small producers (red) produced at most 150 MW during the quarter; medium 
producers (blue) produced more than 150 MW but less than 300 MW while large producers (black) 
produced more than 300 MW. Note the sharp increase in the number of small producers from mid-
2004 until mid-2009. This reflects the success government incentives to encourage renewable energy 
producers. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the number of small, medium and large producers, each quarter, 
respectively in red, blue and black. While the numbers of medium and large producers increased 
gradually, the number of small producers started increasing in mid-2004 then increased 
exponentially from 2006 to 2009, before stabilizing from 2010 until 2012. Consequently we divided 
the study period into three periods: 
· 2002 till mid-2004, when the number of small producers was fairly constant 
· October 2004 till mid-2009 when the number of small producers increased rapidly 
· Late 2009 till end 2012 when the number of small producers stabilized. 
We consider that the increase in number of small producers during the middle period is mainly due 
to new producers of renewable energy. We now show that the bidding behavior of the nuclear 
plants was as expected: 100% at zero cost during the first period. During the second period, it 
changed frequently – producers were trying to adapt to the changing situation. In the third period, 
the bidding patterns stabilized, with several producers offering part of their production at 91.01 € 
per MWh. 
3.4 Nuclear plants in Spain 
Nine nuclear power plants were constructed in Spain (Table 1), and none in Portugal. Table 1 gives 
their names, their trading codes, their owners and their production capacities. 
 
 
 
Small 
Large 
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Table 1: Nuclear power plants in Spain, their owners, their nominal capacity and the code used to 
represent their bids on the power exchange. Sources: OMIE file Lista Unidade 
 
3.4 Evolution of Bidding Strategies of Nuclear Power Plants  
3.4.1 First period: 2002 - mid 2004: a calm period 
In 2002, three of the 9 nuclear power plants ( VAN2, ASC1 and ASC2) offered all of their production 
at zero cost; five more (ALZ1, ALZ2, COF2, GAR1 and TRL1) offered almost all the electricity produced 
at zero cost and the rest (less than 3%) at the market ceiling price of 180.3 euro per MWh while the 
last one (JCB1) offered 93% (140 MW) of its production at zero cost and the remaining 7% at 150 
euro per MWh (Table 2).  
Table 2: Summary of the bids made by the 9 nuclear plants in 2002. Source: our calculations. 
% at ALZ1 ALZ2 ASC1 ASC2 COF1 GAR1 JCB TRL1 VAN2 
0 € 97% 97.4% 100% 100% 98.4% 99.1% 93% 98.9% 100% 
150 € 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0% 0% 
180.3 € 3% 2.6% 0% 0% 1.6% 0.9% 0% 1.1% 0% 
 
Figure 3 shows the quantity of electricity offered by ASC2 at zero cost hour by hour throughout 2002. 
This is a typical production profile for a nuclear plant: 100% production all the time except during 
planned maintenance and occasional outages. The production profiles of the other 8 nuclear power 
plants are show in Appendix 1. The bidding strategies remained the same in 2003 and the first three 
quarters of 2004, but they changed in the fourth quarter.  
 
Code Name Owner Max Capacity 
ALZ1 C.N. ALMARAZ 1 GAS NATURAL SDG 
ENDESA GENERACIÓN, S.A 
IBERDROLA GENERACIÓN 
1032 MWe 
ALZ2 C.N. ALMARAZ 2 GAS NATURAL SDG 
ENDESA GENERACIÓN, S.A 
IBERDROLA GENERACIÓN 
1027 MWe 
ASC1 C.N. ASCÓ 1 ENDESA GENERACIÓN, S.A 
IBERDROLA GENERACIÓN 
930 MWe 
ASC2 C.N. ASCÓ 2 ENDESA GENERACIÓN, S.A 
IBERDROLA GENERACIÓN 
930 MWe 
COF1 C.N. COFRENTES IBERDROLA GENERACIÓN 994 MWe 
GAR1 C.N. STA MARIA DE GAROÑA NUCLENOR 460 MWe 
JCB1 C.N. JOSE CABRERA GAS NATURAL SDG 160 MWe 
TRL1 C.N. TRILLO GAS NATURAL SDG  
NUCLENOR 
1066 MWe 
VAN2 C.N. VANDELLOS1 IBERDROLA GENERACIÓN 
ENDESA GENERACIÓN, S.A 
1080 MWe 
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Figure 3: Quantity of electricity offered by ASC2 at zero cost hour by hour throughout 2002. This is a 
typical production profile for a nuclear plant: 100% production all the time except during planned 
maintenance and occasional outages 
3.4.2 Second period: Oct 2004 – End 2009: A tumultuous period 
On 16 and 17 October 2004, four of the power plants (ASC1, ASC2, GAR1 and VAN2) started offering 
5% of production at 90.01 euro per MWh instead of 180.3 euro. On 29 January 2005, four more 
plants (ALZ1, ALZ2, COF1 and TRL1) dropped their top price from 180.3 euro down to 125 or 130 
euros per MWh, then back up to 150 euros. Even more price changes occurred in 2006. For example, 
between 14 June and 28 August 2006, COF1 offered to sell power at a wide range of prices: 27.5€, 
28.5€, 40€, 4 €, 42.01 €, 45.01€, 50€, 50.01€, 52.02 €, 54.02€, 54.99€, 55.02€, 61.03€, 62.02€, 
133.75€ and 140€. 
ASC1 and ASC2 started selling most of their production via bilateral contracts rather than on the day-
ahead market. Changes in bidding patterns were frequent until 8 August 2009 when four plants 
settled on the following top prices around 91 euros per MWh: 
· ASC1    91.00 euros per MWh 
· ASC2, GAR1 and VAN2  91.01 euro per MWh 
It is not clear why the prices of 91.00 and 91.01 were chosen. But as the four power stations changed 
on the same date, the decision was concerted. Secondly, the fact that ASC1 was offering its 
production at a slightly lower price means that it would be called before the other three. 
Lastly, in 2006, the smallest of the nine plants JCB1 stopped production. 
3.4.3 Third period: 2010 – 2012: Stable Period 
From 2010 onwards, the eight remaining plants offered only part of their production for sale on the 
day-ahead market. Figure 4 shows the quantity offered by TRL1, hour by hour during 2011. Note how 
rapidly the quantity offered rises up. Since nuclear power plants are not designed to ramp up and 
down quickly, the plant was probably at full production with the rest being sold via bilateral 
contracts.  
During this period, a significant part of the production was sold via bilateral contracts. There were 
two bidding patterns for what was offered on the day-ahead market, four (ASC1, ASC2, GAR1 and 
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VAN2) offered part at zero and the rest at 91.00 and 91.01 euro while the other four (ALZ1, ALZ2, 
COF1, and TRL1) bid at zero cost. 
 
Figure 4: Quantity of electricity offered by TRL1 at zero cost hour by hour throughout 2011. Note how 
quickly the quantity increased and decreased. Since nuclear plants normally run at full production 
except during maintenance periods and outages, this plant is probably selling the rest via bilateral 
contracts. 
3.5 Why offer to sell power at 91 euro per MWh?  
As the average prices on the day-ahead market in 2010, 2011 and 2012 were 37.0, 49.9 and 47.2 
euros, it seems rather strange to offer part of the production at 91.00 and 91.01 euro. We wondered 
whether the bids were ever accepted and what effect this strategy would have had on market prices. 
Much to our surprise, the market closing price was actually 91.01 euros on two occasions at H20 and 
H22 in 2011 (Figure 5).  So these bids were accepted on those two occasions, and nuclear power 
became the marginal producer. At all other times, the quantity of electricity offered at 91 euros was 
effectively removed from the market. Studies on the exercise of market power in electricity markets 
have shown that an unusually high incidence of outages during the electricity crisis in California 
pushed prices up (Joskow, 2001).  
We also wondered whether many other sellers had made bids near 91.01 euro on those two days. As 
can be seen from the two tables in Appendix 2, there were seven bids at 91.02 euros at H20 and 
twelve at H22 plus one at 91.00 and another at 91.01, all from traditional thermal power plants. This 
seems an extraordinary coincidence. 
 
3.6  Building a Counterfactual Time Series of Prices 
In order to evaluate the impact of offering part of their production at 91 or 91.01 euro per MWh, we 
constructed a counterfactual time series by setting all the offers made by nuclear generators to zero, 
and computing the new day-ahead price. Having all the individual bids together with the bidders’ 
names, it was easy to determine what the aggregate selling curve would have been, and hence 
11 
 
determine the new theoretical price where the two curves intersect. The difficulty lies in working out 
what effect the four types of constraints would have had. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Day-ahead prices at H20 and H22 (superimposed) throughout 2011. Note that the day-
ahead price was 91.01 euro per MWh on two occasions (9 January and 7 November). Surprisingly the 
marginal producer turned out to be the nuclear power plants (ASC2, GAR1 and VAN2). Another 
surprising feature is the number of days in spring/summer when the price was equal to 53 euro. 
 
Our first idea was to plot the day-ahead price versus the theoretical price, fit a regression line and 
hence deduce what day-ahead price would correspond to the new theoretical price. As can be seen 
from Figure 6, there is too much dispersion for this to be effective. So we made the simplifying 
assumption that the ratio of the day-ahead price to the theoretical price would have remained the 
same as it was for that hour 
3.7 Results 
This approach was applied to the data for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012; that is, for all 8760 hours in 
each year. Table 3 gives the average day-ahead price (top row) and the average of the estimated day-
ahead price (second row). Knowing the volume of electricity sold during each hour, we computed the 
total revenue to sellers on the day-ahead market (third row), and likewise what the total cost would 
have been if the bids by nuclear power stations had all been at zero (fourth row). The difference 
between the two corresponds to the additional revenue generated by this bidding strategy. The 
Price at 20H & 22H = 91.01 €    
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amounts were about 200M euros per year for the three years considered. So this very simple and 
apparently innocuous strategy significantly increased the producers’ revenue.  
Figure 6: Day-ahead price in Spain versus the theoretical price (i.e. the intersection of the aggregate 
curves of offers to buy/sell electricity without taking account of the four types of complex 
constraints). The red points correspond to peak hour prices between H8 and H23, while the black ones 
are off-peak prices. There is too much dispersion to be able to estimate the day-ahead price given the 
theoretical one. 
 
Table 3: Additional Revenue Generated by this Bidding Strategy. The average day-ahead price is given 
in the top line (Source OMIE) ; the average of the counterfactual prices obtained if the nuclear 
generators offered all available power at zero euros instead of 91 or 91.01 euro (second line). By 
multiplying the first two lines by the total quantity transacted on the day-ahead market we obtain the 
total revenue received by all the sellers (third row) and the revenue that they would have obtained if 
the nuclear generators offered their power at zero (fourth row). The additional revenue obtained by 
sellers is given in the last line. That is, this additional amount was paid by consumers. 
 2010 2011 2012 
Average of Actual Day Prices 37.0098 € 49.9198 € 47.2379 € 
Estimated Day-Ahead Price if nuclear plants 
offered all their production at 0€ 
36.0041 € 48.9930 € 46.0705 € 
Total Cost of Electric Power 8805 M€ 11053 M€ 11190 M€ 
New Estimated Total Cost 8605 M € 10881 M€ 10968 M€ 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Discussion, Conclusions and Perspectives 
Our analysis of the evolution of the bidding strategies of nuclear power plants on the Spanish day-
ahead auction market, over the 11-year period from 2002 until December 2012, showed that at the 
outset the nuclear plants offered almost all their production at zero cost; by the end, several plants 
were offering about 5% of their production at about 91 euro per MWh compared to the market 
ceiling price of 180.3 euro per MWh. During that time the proportion of renewable energy especially 
wind and solar power increased dramatically. This change in bidding strategy effectively increased 
the average wholesale price of electricity, leading to an overall increase in revenues to power sellers 
of about $200 million euros per year in 2010 -2012, compared what it would have been had they 
offered all their production at zero cost. This result has implications for regulatory authorities. 
 
What view should we take on such practices? On the one hand, as McRae and Wolak (2009) noted: 
A firm’s management has a fiduciary responsibility to its shareholders to take all legal actions to 
maximize the profits it earns from participating in the wholesale market. On the other hand 
consumers have to pay the additional cost. But whatever view one takes on the practices, regulators 
and policy makers, and the community in general should be aware of what is going on. 
 
What about other types of producers?  In this paper we provide detailed evidence of how one class 
of producers, nuclear power plants, have modified their behavior from an almost “pure merit order” 
approach to strategic bidding. Preliminary work suggests that all classes of producers, thermal plants 
and even hydro plants, have adopted similar strategic bidding strategies. Tables 4, 5 & 6 show the 
bids made by a typical CCGT and a major hydro producer respectively from the seventh hour (H7) 
until H13 on the 1st and 2nd January, 2011. The tables give the prices (top line) and the quantities that 
were offered at each price on those two days (lower line). Looking at Table 4, we see that from 
midnight until H7, the CCGT offered all its production (408.6 MW) at the market maximum price of 
180.3 euro (that is, it did not want to produce). From then on it ramped up. At H8, it offered 150 MW 
at zero cost, and the rest at the maximum price. From H9 onward it offered its production at 7 
different production ranging from 0 euro up to 20 euro, then the rest at 180.3 euro. Note how the 
quantities vary from one hour to the next on the same day even if the prices remain the same, and 
secondly that the prices change from one day to the next. Clearly it is not bidding all its production at 
its marginal production cost. At first we were surprised to find the plants offering their production at 
Difference  200.2 M€ 172.2 M€ 221.6 M€ 
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the maximum market price when they clearly would not be called to produce. According Espinosa 
(2013b), Spanish power plants receive a capacity payment (designed to encourage investment and 
availability) in addition to the market price for any power that they offer to sell via the day-ahead 
market. This would give them a strong incentive to make the offer, even if they were not really 
interested in producing.  Looking at Tables 5 & 6 we see a very similar pattern of bids at 11 or 12 
prices ranging from 0 to 145 euros. The main difference is that the prices provide better coverage of 
the effective day-ahead prices.  
 
Implica
tions 
for 
agent-
based 
simulat
ions 
Most 
agent-
based 
simulati
ons of 
wholes
ale 
electrici
ty 
market
s 
assume 
that 
power 
plants 
offer 
their 
product
ion at 
the 
margin
al 
product
ion 
cost. As 
is well-known this optimizes social welfare. This study shows that while producers may have been 
bidding according to the “merit order”, they certainly are not now. Moreover it provides guidelines 
for more realistic behavior of the producers. 
1 Jan 2011 PRICES & VOLUMES offered by a typical CCGT:  
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 Table 
4: Bids 
made 
by a 
typical 
CCGT 
on 1
st
 
and 2
nd
 
January 
2011 
from 
H7 to 
H13. 
From 
midnig
ht until 
H7, the 
plant 
offered 
all its 
product
ion 
(408.6 
MW) at 
the 
market 
maxim
um 
price of 
180.3 
euro (that is, it did not want to produce). From then on it ramped up. At H8, it offered 150 MW at 
zero cost, and the rest at the maximum price. From H9 onward it offered its production at 7 different 
production ranging from 0 euro up to 20 euro, then the rest at 180.3 euro. Note how the quantities 
vary from one hour to the next on the same day even if the prices remain the same, and secondly that 
the prices change from one day to the next. Clearly it is not bidding all its production at its marginal 
production cost. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
7H 180.3€ 
(408.6) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
8H 0€ 
(150) 
180.3€ 
(258.6) 
0 0 0 0 0 
9H 0€ 
(256) 
10€ 
(25.7) 
12.50€ 
(25.7) 
15€ 
(25.7) 
17.50€ 
(25.7) 
20€ 
(25.7) 
180.3€ 
(15.1) 
10H 0€ 
(256) 
10€ 
(25.6) 
12.50€ 
(25.6) 
15€ 
(25.6) 
17.50€ 
(25.6) 
20€ 
(25.6) 
180.3€ 
(15.6) 
11H 0€ 
(256) 
10€ 
(25.3) 
12.50€ 
(25.4) 
15€ 
(25.4) 
17.50€ 
(25.4) 
20€ 
(25.4) 
180.3€ 
(16.7) 
12H 0€ 
(256) 
10€ 
(25.2) 
12.50€ 
(25.2) 
15€ 
(25.2) 
17.50€ 
(25.2) 
20€ 
(25.2) 
180.3€ 
(17.6) 
2 Jan 2011 PRICES & VOLUMES offered by a typical CCGT 
 
7H 180.3€ 
(408.6) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
8H 0€ 
(150) 
180.3€ 
(258.6) 
0 0 0 0 0 
9H 0€ 
(256) 
10€ 
(32) 
13.33€ 
(32.1) 
16.60€ 
(32.1) 
20€ 
(32.1) 
180.3€ 
(15.3) 
0 
10H 0€ 
(256) 
10€ 
(31.7) 
13.33€ 
(31.7) 
16.60€ 
(31.7) 
20€ 
(31.7) 
180.3€ 
(16.8) 
0 
11H 0€ 
(256) 
10€ 
(31.3) 
13.33€ 
(31.2) 
16.60€ 
(31.2) 
20€ 
(31.2) 
180.3€ 
(18.7) 
0 
12H 0€ 
(256) 
10€ 
(30.8) 
13.33€ 
(30.8) 
16.60€ 
(30.8) 
20€ 
(30.8) 
180.3€ 
(20.4) 
0 
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Table 5: Bids made by a major hydro producer on 1
st
 January 2011 from H6 to H13. It offered its 
production at 12 different production ranging from 0 euro up to 145 euro. Note how the quantities 
vary from one hour to the next on the same day even if the prices remain the same, and secondly that 
the prices change from one day to the next.   
 
1 Jan 2011                           Prices (above) Volumes (below)    
6H 
37.45 38.24 41.37 42.25 43.38 45.88 47.46 50.92 59.76 89.85 145.00 
 179.8 179.8 64.2 179.8 64.2 197.9 64.2 64.2 227.2 197.9 1361.8 
 
7H 
0.00 37.45 38.24 41.37 42.25 43.38 45.88 47.46 50.92 59.76 89.85 145.00 
373.6 179.8 179.8 64.2 179.8 64.2 197.9 64.2 64.2 227.2 197.9 1361.8 
8H 
0.00 37.45 38.24 41.37 42.25 43.38 45.88 47.46 50.92 59.76 89.85 145.00 
373.6 179.8 179.8 64.2 179.8 64.2 197.9 64.2 64.2 227.2 197.9 1361.8 
9H 
0.00 37.45 38.24 41.37 42.25 43.38 45.88 47.46 50.92 59.76 89.85 145.00 
373.6 179.8 179.8 64.2 179.8 64.2 197.9 64.2 64.2 227.2 197.9 1361.8 
10H 
0.00 37.45 38.24 41.37 42.25 43.38 45.88 47.46 50.92 59.76 89.85 145.00 
373.6 179.8 179.8 64.2 179.8 64.2 197.9 64.2 64.2 227.2 197.9 1361.8 
11H 
0.00 37.45 38.24 41.37 42.25 43.38 45.88 47.46 50.92 59.76 89.85 145.00 
373.6 179.8 179.8 64.2 179.8 64.2 197.9 64.2 64.2 227.2 197.9 1361.8 
12H 
0.00 37.45 38.24 41.37 42.25 43.38 45.88 47.46 50.92 59.76 89.85 145.00 
447.6 179.8 179.8 64.2 179.8 64.2 197.9 64.2 64.2 227.2 197.9 1287.8 
13H 
37.45 38.24 41.37 42.25 43.38 45.88 47.46 50.92 59.76 89.85 145.00 
 179.8 179.8 64.2 179.8 64.2 197.9 64.2 64.2 227.2 197.9 1248.8 
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Table 6: Bids made by a major hydro producer on 2
nd
 January 2011 from H6 to H13. It offered its 
production at 12 different production ranging from 0 euro up to 145 euro. Note how the quantities 
vary from one hour to the next on the same day even if the prices remain the same, and secondly that 
the prices change from one day to the next.  
 
  
 
2 Jan 2011                   Prices (above) Volumes (below) 
6H 
37.45 38.24 41.37 42.25 43.38 45.88 47.46 54.23 65.74 89.85 145.00 
179.8 179.8 64.2 179.8 64.2 197.9 64.2 64.2 227.2 197.9 1482.8 
7H 
37.45 38.24 41.37 42.25 43.38 45.88 47.46 54.23 65.74 89.85 145.00 
179.8 179.8 64.2 179.8 64.2 197.9 64.2 64.2 227.2 197.9 1482.8 
8H 
37.45 38.24 41.37 42.25 43.38 45.88 47.46 54.23 65.74 89.85 145.00 
179.8 179.8 64.2 179.8 64.2 197.9 64.2 64.2 227.2 197.9 1414.8 
9H 
37.45 38.24 41.37 42.25 43.38 45.88 47.46 54.23 65.74 89.85 145.00 
179.8 179.8 64.2 179.8 64.2 197.9 64.2 64.2 227.2 197.9 1414.8 
10H 
37.45 38.24 41.37 42.25 43.38 45.88 47.46 54.23 65.74 89.85 145.00 
179.8 179.8 64.2 179.8 64.2 197.9 64.2 64.2 227.2 197.9 1414.8 
11H 
37.45 38.24 41.37 42.25 43.38 45.88 47.46 54.23 65.74 89.85 145.00 
179.8 179.8 64.2 179.8 64.2 197.9 64.2 64.2 227.2 197.9 1414.8 
12H 
37.45 38.24 41.37 42.25 43.38 45.88 47.46 54.23 65.74 89.85 145.00 
179.8 179.8 64.2 179.8 64.2 197.9 64.2 64.2 227.2 197.9 1414.8 
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Appendix 1: Bidding behavior of nuclear plants in 2002  
The production profile and the bidding structure of eight of the 9 nuclear power plants are 
presented. (The corresponding information for the ninth one ASC2 is shown in Figure 3). The 
first two plants, ASC1 and VAN2, are like ASC2. They offered all available electricity at zero 
cost except during planned maintenance and outages. See figures A1.1 and A1.2.  
Figure A1.1 the nuclear power plant ASC1 offered all of its production at zero cost during 
2002 
Figure A1.2 the nuclear power plant VAN2 offered all of its production at zero cost during 
2002. Note the planned maintenance early in the year 
The next five nuclear plants (ALZ1, ALZ2, COF1, GAR1 and TRL1) offer almost all their 
production at zero cost and the rest (less than 3%) at the ceiling price for the market 180.3 
euro per MWh. The last one (JCB1) offered 93% at zero and the remaining 7% at 150 euro 
per MWh. The bids at 150 euro and at 180.3 euro were not accepted.  
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Figure A1.3 the nuclear power plant ALZ1 offered almost all of its production at zero cost 
during 2002. Note the planned maintenance early in the year  
Figure A1.4 the nuclear power plant ALZ2 offered almost all of its production at zero cost 
during 2002.  
Figure A1.5 the nuclear power plant COF1 offered almost all of its production at zero cost 
during 2002. Note the outages in addition to the maintenance period. 
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Figure A1.6 the nuclear power plant GAR1 offered almost all of its production at zero cost 
during 2002.  
 
Figure A1.7 the nuclear power plant TRL1 offered almost all of its production at zero cost 
during 2002. 
 
Figure A1.8 the nuclear power plant JCB1 offered 93% of its production at zero cost during 
2002. 
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Appendix 2: Bids just above and below the maximum day-ahead price of 91.01 euro per 
MWh in 2011 
Table A2.1: Bids made at H20 on 
Bid Price Volume Code Type  
86.69 125.0 ALIMA  LIMA (EDP) 
86.78 17.0 CTJON1R Combined Cycle C.C.Castejon1 (REPR) 
86.91 25.0 DANSV03  Dansk Import 
87.49 74.4 SIL Hydro U.G.H. Sil 
87.63 300.0 FOI1 Thermal C.T. Foix 
88.09 59.4 CRC1 Thermal C.T Cercs 1 
88.97 248.7 SRI3 Thermal C.T. Soto 3 
89.07 76.3 SRI3 Thermal C.T. Soto 3 
89.91 25.0 DANSV03  Dansk Import 
91.00 41.0 ASC1 Nuclear C.N. Asco 1 
91.01 22.0 GAR1 Nuclear C.N. Garona 
91.01 32.1 VAN1 Nuclear C.N. Vandellos 2 
91.01 28.7 ASC2 Nuclear C.N. Asco 2 
91.02 419.7 PGR5 Thermal C.T. Puentes 5 
91.02 2.5 LIT1 Thermal C.T. Litoral 
91.02 0.3 PGR3 Thermal C.T. Puentes 3 
91.02 1.1 PGR1 Thermal C.T. Puentes 1 
91.02 1.1 PGR2 Thermal C.T. Puentes 2 
91.02 0.9 PGR4 Thermal C.T. Puentes 4 
91.02 62.1 LIT2 Thermal C.T. Litoral 2 
91.71 54.5 DUER Hydro U.G.H Duer 
92.3 26.4 STC4R Combined Cycle C.C. Santurce 4 
92.45 605.2 ALG3 Thermal C.T Algeciras 3 
92.87 488.0 BRR1 Thermal C.T. Los Barrios 1 
94.24 84.7 SIL Hydro U.G.H. Sil 
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Table A2.2: Bids made at H22 
     
Bid Price Volume Code Type Name 
84.75 73.8 SIL Hydro U.G.H. Sil 
85.50 40.6 AGUG Hydro U.G.H. Aguayo 
89.00 30.0 TEMON Hydro Sistema Tejo-Mondego 
90.00 83.5 VIES Hydro U.G.H.Viesgo 
91.00 39.0 ASC1 Nuclear C.N. Asco 1 
91.00 31.1 PGR1 Thermal C.T. Puentes 1 
91.01 60.0 ELC1 Thermal C.T. Elcogas GICC 
91.01 20.0 GAR1 Nuclear C.N. Garona 
91.01 5.70 ASC2 Nuclear C.N. Asco 2 
91.01 19.1 VAN2 Nuclear C.N. Vandellos 2 
91.02 31.1 PGR2 Thermal C.T. Puentes 2 
91.02 22.1 LIT3 Thermal C.T. Litoral 3 
91.02 30.3 PGR3 Thermal C.T. Puentes 3 
91.02 17.5 LIT1 Thermal C.T. Litoral 1 
91.02 33.0 TER1 Thermal C.T.Teruel 1 
91.02 30.9 PGR4 Thermal C.T. Puentes 4 
91.02 33.0 TER2 Thermal C.T.Teruel 2 
91.02 32.0 TER3 Thermal C.T.Teruel 3 
91.02 24.0 CC03 Thermal C.T. Compostilla 3 
91.02 17.0 COM4 Thermal C.T. Compostilla 4 
91.02 7.0 CC02 Thermal C.T. Compostilla 2 
91.02 16.0 COM5 Thermal C.T. Compostilla 5 
92.30 26.4 STC4R Combined Cycle C.C. Santurce 4 
93.20 16.9 CTJON2R Combined Cycle C.C. Castejon 2  
95.7.0 412.0 CTN3 Combined Cycle C.C. Castellon 3 
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